There exists no pentagon in the plane all of whose lengths (sides and diagonals) are rational.Passed on to me by a friend. And no, I don't know the answer.
One fact that is known: no regular pentagon in the plane can have integer coordinates.
Ruminations on computational geometry, algorithms, theoretical computer science and life
There exists no pentagon in the plane all of whose lengths (sides and diagonals) are rational.Passed on to me by a friend. And no, I don't know the answer.
I just started a new class recently and am in need of a good classI have to ask: how does this person know they will like the course if they are not interested in the material ?
project.
The course is a graduate course in computational geometry.
I think I will like this course but, overall, I don't find myself too
much interested in teh material
I figure a good project will help motivate me through the course and,
well, a project is required anyway! :)
My main interests are in number theory and cryptography.
Any suggestions for a nice little project that could be done in the
span of several weeks by a beginning graduate student? The idea could
either be theoretical or an implementation in code or perhaps a bit of
both.
The growing financial importance of research also could pressure Harvard to tap a scientist, something it hasn't done since 1933.I don't get it. Being a giant science lab is a BAD thing ?But Harvard also could go the other way -- picking a nonscientist who could rise above turf battles and reassure the rest of the school that America's oldest and richest university isn't becoming a giant science lab.
The footballcommentary.com Dynamic Programming Model is intended to provide guidance for certain decisions that arise during a game, such as two-point conversions and going for it on fourth down. This article explains the main ideas of the Model in simplified form. [...]
The Model is built around the idea that in making decisions, we are trying to maximize our team's probability of winning the game, and the opponents are trying to minimize that probability. There are three types of situations, called states, in which the Model explicitly evaluates our probability of winning. The first type of state is when one team or the other has just gained possession. The second type is when a team has just scored a touchdown, but has not yet tried for the extra point (or points). The third type is when a team is about to kick off.
We present arbitrary coinciding factors that are hierarchical and use predecessors as well as important jobs. We show there exist revenues that are treasure sales and independent for identical parametric desires.
"The notion of a discrete math community is an interesting one and somewhat perverse"
"Please don't exhume this dead horse just to kick the rotting bones around. Again"
"Whatever comes in sufficiently large quantities commands the general admiration." Trurl the Constructor, from Stanislaw Lem's Cyberiad.I've been reading Malcolm Gladwell's masterful article on the Enron scandal, and he frames it with the device of 'puzzles' vs 'mysteries':
There is a fundamental problem that comes up when you start messing with "data". Our training in algorithms makes us instinctively define a "problem" when working with data, or any kind of applied domain. Many of the problems in clustering, like k-center, k-median, k-means, or what-have-you, are attempts to structure and organize a domain so we can apply precise mathematical tools.The national-security expert Gregory Treverton has famously made a distinction between puzzles and mysteries. Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts are a puzzle. We can’t find him because we don’t have enough information. The key to the puzzle will probably come from someone close to bin Laden, and until we can find that source bin Laden will remain at large.
The problem of what would happen in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein was, by contrast, a mystery. It wasn’t a question that had a simple, factual answer. Mysteries require judgments and the assessment of uncertainty, and the hard part is not that we have too little information but that we have too much. The C.I.A. had a position on what a post-invasion Iraq would look like, and so did the Pentagon and the State Department and Colin Powell and Dick Cheney and any number of political scientists and journalists and think-tank fellows. For that matter, so did every cabdriver in Baghdad. [....]
If things go wrong with a puzzle, identifying the culprit is easy: it’s the person who withheld information. Mysteries, though, are a lot murkier: sometimes the information we’ve been given is inadequate, and sometimes we aren’t very smart about making sense of what we’ve been given, and sometimes the question itself cannot be answered. Puzzles come to satisfying conclusions. Mysteries often don’t.